

Cuba

"Hard" winters

Wyle:

[Thought for military: JFK was not a "great":  
his reactions are to be expected (not that different  
from the); and they are not easily thwarted  
(easy to underestimate his willingness to accept "loss" or  
the costs of inaction or attention to military plan).  
So study his reactions, constraints — in relation to this.]

[Consider threat — to staff — of being "cut out" if they  
are critics, captives, etc.]

On demonstrations: If you let release all weapons when  
you use one, resistance by military;

If you do, danger of loss of control: not unwillingness  
by OCS.

[Now, 5 weapons can be released one at a time without  
releasing all. (or, without <sup>code</sup> deauthorizing).]

Request for weapons could reach higher command faster  
than info on which to base judgment.)

## Constraints to Participation

No use of nukes, removal of nukes from nukes; [London  
mission infeasible]; measures against unauthorized use,  
operation of one or more countries from hostilities; geographic  
limitations on strikes; losses of targets; sanctuaries.

[Types of weapons: look at constraints considered  
in all future crises.]

Effect of nuclear rules for dual-capable weapons:

- 1) Reluctance by military to expand them in HE war
- 2) Time for conversion: how long, on large scale?
- 3) Some commanders would rather have conventional  
weapons for AD that they would be allowed to use
- 4) These forces may go further into deep freeze in crisis.  
(What about in Vietnam? CBAF in Cuba?)

(When does CACOR become BACOR? Why?)

a non-US nation gives in force

When/what is agreement to NATO a precondition of action.



Sievert Aug 27, '63

History

[ How sure were we that we would attack? ]

What made him that sure?

How surprising was blockade? JFK speech?

How much was he on 23 Oct? Would blockade were less worried about?

[ If SA-2 shootdown of U-2 was unauthorized — how much did it worry K? JFK? ]

If U-2 unauthorized was unauthorized, how much did it worry JFK? K? ]

[ Block-Cop problem. Why did nations take the  
characteristic actions they did? Under what circumstances  
would they act the same — or different? ]

Not enough data, experience for input — what study —  
looking, inner structure changes. Pay, need look at the numbers? ]  
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (or important) OUTPUTS OF THE PROC?



[Did SO think that "the problem" was to get  
some missiles on island — not, deployed —  
prior to detection? <sup>"disposition"</sup> Explain difference in SO move  
to Cuba, US move to Turkey; why didn't latter create  
crisis? What responsible act might we do?]

Would SO think it important to ~~not~~ postpone  
detection by a few days or weeks — even they were  
there? What if they had — so that our first  
look showed ready missiles?

Why would headlines have made us willing to attack?

How important in supporting our response was a US  
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable  
to US, indefensible? ]

Missile reports in August: either added to SAM or  
omitted, or shown incorrect.

[Were there false alarms in Aug. Sept  
from intell analysts, or null or refugees?]

Suggestive reports after mid-Sept:

1) Specific zone in Pinar del Rio heavily guarded  
by Suro, Cuban missile.

2) oral comments by Castro side: we have MRBM under  
3) " " " : some stone weapons.

4) sighting of tank coming with what looked like MRBM.

Early Sept. restrictions on flying, based on DCI instruction ✓

Had to have should be greater possible photo work.

Aug 31- Sept. restriction on sea lift of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct - Oct 11, restriction on 31-25/26

Oct 12: <sup>-22</sup> special class system.

[Some: "create analysis" left quiet after mid-Sept; Sept 13 special.]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ "tension", fear of 'incidents' that would heighten

tension & raise prob of crisis (not quite believed

to be high) → constraints on 3) info-gathering

(U-2 recon, ship movements) → delayed recognition of problem  
increased impact of "surprise"

and on 4) alert, readiness.

[What if SALTs had been structured,  
& were threatened, prior to Oct. 14?  
& consider dependence on photos.]

→ decreased readiness,

flexibility

→ increased vulnerability

Both increase chance of a first scramble

[Anyone seeing at a first scramble can -

should win at these efforts. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effort of that

on 3) recon, 4) readiness.

SALTs?  
U-2 over China; U-2 over S. Atlantic

24 Aug 30<sup>th</sup>

WHAT IF THESE WAS HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Wouldn't have seen 3-2's report; but might have taken  
agent reports more seriously; maybe on overnight, esp. Sept 20!)



[Notes concerning of Best flight being first side  
it was — not later — corner!]

[What would have been difference of our straight constraint  
on island corner?]

Sept 10: See Note objection to Carter flight plan. extensive  
preliminal & overflight (containing internal, corner) <sup>to look for</sup> corner 2/1/13.  
internal 4 flights, corner

[Why we proposed to look again at west end?  
Assumption on speech of installation?] [SAMPs?]

[Also mission on 10th cancelled? Why?] [Where?]

<sup>over NE</sup>  
Flight for 10th delayed then cancelled for weather. Over Pine.

17 Sept: unusable photos. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown when weather good. 4 days before takeoff.

Between Sept 5 - Oct 14, 5 scheduled missions cancelled  
for bad weather over target; no other flown, but observed.

[Did this Committee foresee the problem?]

Mission started to cover base from 22-26

Flight program completed Oct 7.

Flight staff: mostly SA-2 to find out if operational? "

From R. L. H. - Oct 2, reports mutual suspicion

among analysts of NABAC: west of Vietnam

Cost 'published'?

[Why not checked at  
immediately?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both

Oct 4: McC argued for extensive overflights.

[William said his suspicion started?] Special Group requested

study (by NABAC off, SAC, CMA) of alternative means of recon,

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear  
report (see ?); planned flights: bad weather on 10-13-57.

[Why does CIA plan create issue of overflying international  
waters, but SAC preferred mission was not?]

[How did weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 missions flown —  
compare to NABAC Oct 2-14?]



any

Informant Oct 15: McEl, Kippert, Connolly, Taylor,  
Curtis, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Kellman, McEl,  
Carter, Bandy. [P.T.]

[Johnson? Kippert, Connolly?  
Curtis? Johnson? Who else was actually told?

What did they do? What about? Felt? First  
responses? Did they know or suspect JFK to be told?

Orders? Time? Why tell them but not JFK?

How unusual was this?

At first meeting, were Johnson, Kippert, Connolly, Taylor, Martin, Kellman, McEl, Carter, Bandy?  
What versions, other than one version? Any? Responses?

[What can be inferred about responses if news had  
been different?] ]

[If photos had revealed JFK's injuries & death, with  
wounds - immediate in that night would have  
been obvious. Johnson - would have been, without doubt!  
Why? How come?]



Wednesday: meeting with Mr. Poles (who left in afternoon?)

One of first suggestions (under?) : that hit U-2 in 1960  
("should" have been treated as a "mistake" to be "corrected"  
"externally"  
by hitting in strike.

[Could we have? <sup>yes</sup> How fast? How?]

[Did K prob. that that operational status of weapons  
would influence us — that early discovery would make  
us more willing to act?]

Rhetorical (?) question (under?): W/2 etc. first accept  
missiles? (NOTE: this would support our retention of  
ABM in Turkey, if we wanted that! Any action?)

[One position on Cuba a hard back of keeping out  
because of any prediction of this?]

[What access to Oval Office interviews or tapes on Cuba]

Early estimates of strike (WHOSE?): 50 sorties, 75  
bombs for MBBM; another 100 sorties for airfield,  
100 for SAM. Mission needed 2000 sorties, 4000 bombs.

<sup>morning</sup>  
Jdeas Pres: 2 groups, "clm" + "post." [WHO?]

[Also not formal ally of Israel; so blockade...]

IFK decision: presence <sup>of open? programs</sup> could not be accepted.

Thus. aft: without Pres.

Re. in strike: danger to other countries; to Palestinians;  
moral point of striking without warning, particularly as  
it bore on the inevitable (?) Cuban civilian casualties.

[Any thought to demonstration attack?] [clm?]  
[JCS opposed this on 16 Oct]

Blockade regarded as more useful, provocative,  
than limited air strike against nuclear zone. (10-2-1960)  
[How does that look now?] Johnson had called.



Blackburn "act of war" on Oct. 6. But said

that had had "incident": [prelude by Barrett?]

U-2 shootdown. [Really?] Perimeter first looked

small. But might not have made an issue. [! ?]

(Thursday)  
Wednesday Photos: none made.

Friend to Blackburn.

Thought to S: "sincere hope" of his country for  
settlement of German question, important, no progress on  
Berlin.

[No threat on Berlin — as reported?]

G instructed to make it clear that to Cuba was only  
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability  
of Cuba. [not, defensive purpose?]

WFK: no threat of invasion to Cuba; would have been  
glad to give assurances to that effect if K had asked.

[So: guarantee was no new concession?]

G: Saw specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling  
certain kinds of defensive war. [they were spending  
MOSCO, SAMS]

[When Did G know and know? That DeBryen did not  
know.]



Thursday

10 pm : Pres

CV accountable. US not set, but "we have to  
and self respect to respond by an act of aggression"

JFK: tentative decision to blockade, announce Monday

Directed detailed planning

Friday: Pres on tour

Johnson returns to talk of air strike. Discussion

"although tentative Pres decision" ?

Decided to keep option open by having staff work  
done on both. [Bundy? JFK?]

[Stansfield: JFK didn't believe blockade would be  
enough; wanted Bundy to keep "other" from preempting his  
decision by freezing planning on strike.]

[Johnson, via RW: JFK then "reverted" by military  
plan that actually emerged, turned away from strike,  
military, in Johnson.]

Friday night: both lines of action (blockade + large  
strike). "even grounds" to State + Defense. (How? W+O?)

Thompson worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper over weekend

Final drafts of speech written by Stevenson. (see)

Sat. morning: Johnson examines document (see)

(DeLeon?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Stevenson, Thompson, Smith

Discussion: large; almost certainly has to follow  
with invasion (?), Cuban civilian casualties would

be high. Surely conceivable. Pres would not respond

admittedly. <sup>SEE</sup> JFK's plan as presented was "not surgical,"

was "apt to go" (arg?) require massive commitments

Question was "only some of action compatible with  
our principles. Only a small risk the world 'pull the  
long cord'."

// Evening JFK talked to More. Later, to McNamara.  
(Re: Trade: get this)

No beyonds on bases, unless use of problem.

If construction continued, might be necessary to strike  
other minimum basis, unlikely SU would retaliate, esp.  
since SAC sent.

<sup>when</sup>  
If moving missiles were used against US, it might  
be necessary to invade, but not to use missiles against Cuba;  
however, it might be necessary to make a compensating  
strike on SU.

[Any planning? Analysis?]

Sunday morning

Till 10, when final approval to plan, possibility  
we would plan with strike.

2:30 NSC, with Anderson (after dinner?)

[How comes, was "casualty" approach? Did]

A. Johnson involved this?



Monday

11:30 meeting of Excom  
Bates - message to facilities.

5. formal meeting of NSC (McDermott)

established Excom - initial appearance of disunity;  
saying one thing

Importance of not saying state or invasion had been  
considered (& rejected):

Why no guarantee earlier? Lack of "hard" evidence  
to convince. Also: opinion of experts that SCL  
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - via state, invasion

(see Taylor, McN first views?)

Macmillan reply to Bruce Bowdler, 6 Monday: it's not just  
not so much in precedent as in unprecedented condition of  
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for vital action against Berlin, as well  
as persons or weaker parts of the Free World defense system.

Monday night:

[Find out. Rest - DeLong talk, 22 Oct.]

- through,

10:40-11:45 McN and Anderson

and briefing on nuclear weapons. (?)

Tuesday evening:

Rest & Ball: We've won a considerable victory,  
you and I are still here. [Did Rest believe this?]

[Mustardt: Baum & JFC did not; issues were  
not immediate subcommittee, but shipping road.]

[Why did SO persist in denying presence of missiles?]  
[What did this "convoy" mean?]

Excomm. 10: 3 subcommittees. Berlin, adverse planning,  
comm.

Pitje. comm. for inter-allied relationships

Check with her

Advantages of not telling allies they would not be  
able to tie our hands, & would be free to divorce

Washburn.

in N.Y. & Conn.

Fear that Mac would force JFK to engage  
against some course of action.

Tuesday: Memo for JFK (via A-1): Taylor, Talbot & Posters

(Over?)

involvement for MRCB to Europe; privately  
urge funds to place out facilities so even in MLE----

available? prohibitive? Represents by Ernst Powers to

Special from duplicating MRCB to Canada or ME (Int, MLE?)

SEE

7 from Power of Introduction

8 from McN sail 25. 2nd ship enroute to Cuba,

their course unchanged [TRUE?]

in part 24 hrs.



but of all the variants as well [!] would  
be different.

If assurances were given by the Pres. and the govt.  
of the US that the US itself would not participate  
in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from  
actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet,  
this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking  
for Fidel Castro, but if that is what he and the govt. of  
Cuba, evidently, would declare, denunciation and would  
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful Cuba.  
This, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if  
there is no threat, the armaments are a burden for many  
people. This, too, the question of destruction, not only of  
the armaments which you call offensive, but of all the  
armaments as well, would be different.

When the great slow steamship window I propose  
me, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Friday morning: 10:30 am (with Stevenson) (Adelson?)

Work on minutes continuing. E. [Plot fewer charts  
of low crisis]. All still increased.

Does still pending.

deal of Fomin + Scali; directly under UN supervision.

pledge by Castro not to accept offensive weapons (?)

in Cuba; pledge by US not to invade.

Scali, Adelson, Rust. (Chet. Sonnenfeldt?)

Scali - Fomin 7:45: real possibilities, time short.

Also, perhaps at UN and by low. Castro to supervision.

[W44?]

Letter began writing at 6; had been translated  
by US Envoy in Moscow. [so, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if answered by Castro, out of that resulted, this would  
immediately change everything. Otherwise, the question of the  
destruction, out of of the results which you call offensive.



Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would  
insure that the US will not invade Cuba with its  
forces which will not support the any sort of forces which  
might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the  
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in  
Cuba would disappear.

Exposure recovered at 10 pm to dawn.

Agree to trade as soon as possible. Drafting on supply of  
State and in 4. (Recovery of Berlin, in Turkey;  
though, no explicit offer to remove, suggested Castro's consent  
needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult  
historically for US)

[Did Ritz, Posters know?]

no POC blockade, solidifying US interest in Cuba (?) or a possible in Cuba.



1st morning

Excom at 10. Discussing draft reply [draft]

Memorandum, Radio Moscow letter: offer to remove;

Indy, inspection.

Memorandum (drafting) 1: O-2 shot down.

O-2 surging. (Two fighters scrambled. Within hours,  
fire on plane. Castro vowed to shoot down plane.

[Soviet reaction] [under?]

Stops landed.

[Under: JFK attacks on City, Sunday]

Decision by Pres: final act of action letter been for  
solution given next.

Excom at 4: consider personal replies.

2 planes fired on Pres. 4/4 send two messages to K.

Letter sent to 8:05 am.

At that night, message to K letter call NAC.

Excom at 9: discussion of additional steps regarding: and  
a 100 blockade, mobilizing US aircraft shot (?) or a possible in strike.

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NYC 11-3-57 (13 Nov 57)

Probable Intell. Warning of 2nd Attack on the US

[Alternatives, threats, as warning  
conditional prediction of one's own action  
<sup>statement</sup>  
evidence of conditional decision  
(Would threaten under risk,  
but, give odds that he would  
carry it out? Does he  
expect to?)

[May be gets Kees. to do A, which others don't want to do.  
gets them to agree to threaten to do A if third party S  
does & doesn't to Y, gets them to commit US prestige, etc.  
Then for (S)  $\approx$  for (S will lead to do Y, etc.) — what may be  
logically "If you don't come up to 20 days supply,  
we'll come down."

[Thus, reflect the fact that being a not only leads US  
but also leads S, whom we wish to influence.]



The danger of explosion in crisis negotiations rests partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theories as to the "inevitable" course of events in the nature of the opponent or the "possible" alternatives. Cf: "dangerous theories"

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war - breven)  
(Explosive theories). [Mobilization  $\rightarrow$  War]  
[Inability to tell apart from total mob] [When did I see "decide" on War?]

Probability of warning: What hypotheses — is to possible enemy plans, courses of action, goals, values, will evidence be related to? intents

(Also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty: given instruments, what is probability that  $X$  has occurred, given a report, even claims, that  $X$  has been observed by means  $A$ ? Then, what is  $p_A(H_0|X)$ ?



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To interpret SU moves (preparation, deter, threats, insurance  
decision to attack — "How likely to  
they that it is that they will attack?  
Or, that war will occur?

To identify long-odds bets — things they would do only  
if prob of war or attack were high; then try to  
observe them: a) with high prob b) with high confidence  
in observation; c) early.

[This "unequivocal" indication can be valuable without  
(2), given (8) + (9).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied  
moves that may have triggered (French plans in  
consider) SU "response." To identify possible "signals"  
in advance, so as to monitor or suppress, know

- 1) Our operations, intentions;
- 2) SU collection sources  
(prob prob > 2);
- 3) SU model of our behavior; hypotheses they are testing, and  
likelihood functions. Their likelihood functions, 'interpretations' of  
weight of evidence, might depend on 'level of tension.'

The disadvantage of the MCF concept was always that it focused attention on contingencies for which national forces seemed still more suited.

It was always a bad idea that nations could be 'bought off' with MCF: it involves costs, and to justify them requires evidence on needs for which national forces are better.

(If neither is bought, - ~~so~~ fixed costs are high for significant or adequate effectiveness - result is just higher regret, frustration, anxiety, insecurity.)

cost more, but (and more) gets more	$\bar{E}$	$E$	
A	-16	2	{ Blast shelter Rational det.
B	-9	1	{ Fallout shelter MCF
Can't	0	0	

Change B can be justified (over C) only if  $Pr(E) > \frac{2}{10}$ ; but if that is accepted, A will look still better (to subjects; whereas 'persuader', i.e. US, may find much worse, even given E).  
(i.e. before changing S's opinion, inspect his preferences & alternatives, which may differ from yours.)



Turning Points

Crisis Report, Aug. 1962

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SU missile forces in Europe became serious  
about 1957?

SU missile attacks became relatively unlikely after  
(1952, 3, 4?)

SU parity with US in strat nuclear arms (1962?)

[ Two threats: a) initial SU challenge

"broaden or  
escalate" "hostile  
local action"

b) SU decision to enlarge conflict after  
NATO responds (low costs) to challenge.

("expanded attack: after probe, etc.")

(both more likely than before,

given current SU/US posture,  
though: how likely?)

[ ~~SU~~ SU decision (b) now likely because Political Directorate

strat. results no longer valid or plausible: risk of mass + G.W.

in SU for any "expanded local action" in Europe. Hence, Berlin

probably unwilling, in the event, to reply to challenge at all,  
hence, challenge more likely.



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Rejection of "limited nuke war in Europe":

Destroy Alliance.

(Crisis? Spies?)

~~But~~ But: SU would not continue in non-nuke combat

— risks of SU by resistance — manipulation — US attention —

unless tactical victory were close at hand.

Some: "an 'adequate' non-nuke defense is defined reasonably, somewhat

if, imprecisely, as one that could contain any Soviet conventional

attack based on ready forces for a sufficient

time for the winning risks to become clear... The time

perspective should be measured in weeks, or at the most

months, rather than years. [Though, not.]

"winning risks" = "no immediate take of the victory  
of significant & increasing chance of nuke → GW."

[Was not surprised — unhappy to see and SU

missiles appear?

Example where misleading thinking is a function of

"bad events" — which subverts forward policy.

(Preferred policy) ~10

alternative ~10

(esp. where preferred policy has forward events in other contingencies)

-8 thinking to focus on "event" over

-10 or to magnify its prob

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Assume

Potential advantages of threats & limited challenges  
may go up, as risks go down, given current NATO  
strategy, which makes any NATO response frightening to  
allies (but perhaps essential to country challenged);  
provides security, split.

[But it would lead would SO feel that  
ways to your victory  
expansion would bring grave risks of mass on GW?  
What to use say? Plan? Want them to believe?]

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to say "no limited war":

1) Do they then contemplate, especially any  
"hostile local actions"? (e.g., Hamburg).

2) Do they then expect no Western response?

If they expect response, do they propose  
to go to general war? Are they certain  
that we will?



10

Emphasis on prescription focuses attention on:

When do SO think that war has become  
imminent, unavoidable?

[How SO forces over time, 1950's?] <sup>since then, much  
forces down from  
5.75 on to 3.5 on</sup>

[B missile? ALCM? Bomb art? Anti-art?

US anti-art? Big warheads?

[SO doctrine implies that they will retain big non-mus-  
capability - whether they value it or not.]

[But: if big cuts are possible: let's not beat them to it.]

[<sup>2)</sup> What if SO turn up with big ABM program; demonstrate  
anti-satellite; effects on US CD, ABM programs?

3) What if SO acquire bases in other countries

4) E.g. SO sub in Theater area

5) Pure deterrent GW capability?]

Est: SO will attempt to offset US superiority by means other than numbers,

4FCW. SO refers to achieve clear strat. superiority by GND breakthrough  
at intermediate.

[See Vienna notes] [K. Litter]

[ Another misinterpretation:

SU CF Doctrine (UK!)

But if they forget, very minimum deterrence... ]

[ we don't say Civil Defense; & prob of GW is low...

& prob of <sup>US</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> strike is very low...

But: our program, based on CF, keeps them low...

NSAM

55 Relationship of JCS to Pres

82 Allied Mil. Buildup

102 Contin. Planning in Berlin



NATO 50

[Bureau of analogy of COMA Graduate, etc. with  
"Missile Gap"; consider 1980 estimates.]

Emphasize NATO capability to deal with some  
major non-nuclear contingencies; focus on lower risk;  
continue "raising the threshold" without making  
commitments / gambles on assumption of non-nuclear  
"adequacy."

[Local hostile action — big — could arise without  
SU aggression: e.g. FRG response to east  
uprising.]

[Political Directorate statement of problem is sound;  
but solution no longer acceptable — in particular  
as interpreted 1953-61.]

[As MC 14/12 to be made: No concept of limited nuclear  
war in Europe, or with Britain; or prolonged, uncontrolled,  
but limited, non-nuclear war. (There is concept of limited non-nuclear

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- [For my project:]
- 1) Collect statements of US/NATO conditional predictions, conditional expectations; + prior probs.
  - 2) Estimate of SO conditional report.
  - 3) Evidence on " " "
  - 4) Conflicts in above, v with Allies.

e.g. NATO thus speaking effects of mass-mob buildup in Berlin crisis; + threat of mass attack developing out of crisis.



Make good: SU cannot hope to defeat NATO non-nuc  
forces with anything less than a  
prolonged effort by matériel & undeployed non-nuc attack,  
or by nuc weapons. UNC

Distinguish between: a) prolonging, at low level  
(giving chance to Allies to mobilize, & threaten  
or take offensive action) (but not, make SU  
broadened response: nuc safe for SU, US nuc  
response less likely); consider restraints of SU  
offers to negotiate, as in Korea; how likely that  
Allies can make credible threats to force nuc  
after low-key hostilities?

b) broadening, or raising scale of  
violence. US can more plausibly threaten GW or  
use of nuc to avoid almost-certain defeat,  
than to terminate or win a prolonged, limited  
non-nuc local conflict.

[Give some time for counteroffensive action]

1950

NATO plans are always recognised possibility  
of SU attack with limited objections, relation of  
this to SU nuc & non-nuc power (contrast to:  
a) 1/3 SU nuc b) SU nuc monopoly; c) overwhelming  
SU non-nuc <sup>obj</sup> superiority plus SU nuc superiority  
(the; that), and likelihood of Allied non-nuc response



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$\begin{matrix} \text{SO} \\ \text{No tac} \\ \text{Big} \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} \text{No tac} \\ \text{Big} \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} - \text{few} \\ + \text{tac} \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} + \text{tac} \\ + \text{tac} \\ - \text{tac} \end{matrix}$
Distance	GW		(exp, - air)

$\begin{matrix} \text{big} \\ \text{small} \\ + \text{tac} \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} \text{GW} \\ \text{for tac} \\ \text{further, had for} \\ \text{Gangue + SO,} \\ \text{not for SO} \end{matrix}$
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$\begin{matrix} - \text{low} \\ + \text{lots of} \\ + \text{tac} \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} \text{Non-muc} \\ \text{(Dion)} \\ \text{tac} \\ \text{GW} \end{matrix}$
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Non-muc weakness is a signal of increased likelihood of muc response within a given (short) time interval only given that conflict is joined at all: that a military response of some sort is made, by Allies. But this is likely to be doubted by SO.

Saw military Capitalists + Officers, 1962-67

as major underlying aim to contribute to effective defense.

Wants, willingness to plan, back-up for men; 4) resolve not to be defeated.  
not one ever surrenders -- able to press or enforce its views.

Military officers.

## NATO

US commitment is a license for European leaders to neglect their "population insurance" — which they would otherwise have had to pay heavy premiums on, somewhat independent of the prob of the threat (which they regarded as low) or the effectiveness of the capabilities (low, given high fixed costs of significant capability, big SO & capability). This amounted to having US take over their insurance premiums — without costs to US, since: a) prob of challenge thought low or zero, b) low marginal <sup>fixed</sup> cost to US, since SAC needed anyway to US, c) later efforts were ~~from~~ insurance would not have to be paid (US needn't even pay premium).

As with Skybolt: they didn't care whether Skybolt worked or even whether it ever got it — so long as he could tell public it "was coming" — as excuse for cutting Blue Streak, Blue Steel.

Specially irritating to European politicians if public's view of prob of war — or US — is greater than his: so that US keeps backsliding him to contribute to effective defense.

once, c) willingness to plan, back — for war; d) resolve not to be defeated — not even in minor — & able to press or enforce its views.

ambly matters.



Can Early plan to withdraw to Pygmalion; they wanted to  
avoid having to plan that (the planning is not  
conflict: personal responsibility, regret; would planner  
have conceded the "Planned" interference, if it occurred?

Distinguish effects of plan in allocating responsibility,  
personal risks, from causal influence of plan upon  
actual events. (Plan usually taken to imply that if  
planner could have conceded perfectly, he should have  
planned as he did: thus, it reveals his values, expectations,  
in simple way; assuming planner expects, or hopes, that  
plan will be followed literally, in the event.

To what extent did he will, desire, deserve, intend,  
anticipate (actual) consequences? (Did he imagine or  
consider them at all?)

was, challenged to plan, perhaps you must; if decided not to be defeated.  
not sure even intends to concede; insurance & overweight means he  
able to press or enforce its views.  
ambulatory notes.

4. "Local defense" has different meaning for Germans;  
 it could be needed against a local attack;  
 whereas the Allies, who preceded Germany in NATO,  
 would "need" local defense only in context of all-out SU  
attack. (when it would scarcely matter, given nuclear exchange.)

5. What impact has British withdrawal of 1961 had on NATO's  
 enthusiasm for NATO reserve divs?

6. Do recent US policy papers ever define (like 100/11)  
 contingencies that would require use of nuclear, even  
 given MC 26/4? Or, early use?

Ex: not only "massive" invasions, but surprisingly  
 & unfortunately sufficient SU advances. Specific  
unfavorable circumstances that would probably require  
 use of nuc, either early or eventually (if ?) permitted.  
 (e.g., under current conditions; evaluate changes in this).

Then, show 3) reactions, & (4) willingness to contemplate use of  
 nuc, 4) willingness to plan, prepare for nuc; 4) resolve not to be defeated.  
 as all own interests so interlinked; essential to sovereignty demands be  
 able to press or inform its views.  
 involving matters.



7. Issue for European nations of US: is there a threat to Europe (or, to someone) in EU's military strength? Is there a problem there which it is the responsibility of European nations to solve? Would there be, if US did not exist?

3. Entenmann: interview with 10 December, April, 1962.

Answer: US + EU already have made an alliance; no alliance against thermonuclear war.

Danger that they would: [a] conduct limited non-nuclear war in Europe, which US would be content to lose or to allow EU to invade, without using force at all. [b] wage a limited nuclear war in Europe, with US + EU sanctions. Hence, European nations need [the US] strategic weapons: to reduce EU certainty that it could be a sanctuary, while invading or destroying European country.

General harmony of interests between US + France, dependence of France on US; but circumstances could arise in which they did not all their interests so identical; essential to sovereignty France be able to press or refuse its views on military matters.



✓

[ But: world of Alliance to US depends on degree to which France focuses attention & efforts upon contingencies in which they anticipate a conflict of interest. What resources are they devoting to improving common effort in situations where they see common interest? ]

7. What accounts for persistent differences in estimate of the nature & urgency of the SU threat? What agreement upon evidence, model?

Why did European post danger <sup>40</sup> last in late '40's?  
How great was difference: low high did US post danger; what effects even various measures expected & have?

military matters.

10. Value of insurance, or, value of guarantee

That makes it unnecessary to consider a certain contingency at all: reduces it to zero.

Allan: worth of reducing prob from 1% to 0 is more than from 90% to 37%.

Costs of attention. Typical case of diminishing consideration. Pressing demands of certain problem, objectives, if they must be considered. Non-linear utilities: where terrible outcome (e.g., invasion) is at issue, improvement (e.g., better peace) has disproportionate large benefits (in eyes of public, anyway).

Therefore, the drawings — or, improvement w.r.t. other objectives or contingencies — involved in being able/allowed to ignore certain problem, contingencies much greater than from any <sup>other</sup> equivalently large reduction in probability.

Planning "assumptions":

Ex: Reaction to Kentley report: feasibility of small CO program.

Measure of effect of CO guarantee on English subjective "security peace of mind": degree of public ignorance, incoherence, w.r.t. military matters.



11. Why is "consistency" so urgent? Allinson has lived  
with it for 14 years. Is SO threat greater?

(Probably No; but, our expectation that it will be greater,  
say 2 years from now, probably greater). How high is  
it? ✓

Is economic burden to US so great? (Imagine  
European advancing statistics on US "ability to pay, - to  
flow"; compare with past; since how important US  
regards increased capabilities, vs. "consistent" or  
"equitable" capabilities.

(Would Europeans agree with McN on prob. of SO  
attack on Turk. missiles?)



## Wishful Reasoning

(Putting certain facts of "hard" events as if  
that <sup>3/4</sup> some doubts become insoluble, signatures untheorized  
(subsequently, as present, acknowledged, since, known to ignore  
& irrelevant; 6) certain policies - derived for other reasons  
are preferred (inaction, stating yes; one that one is "committed  
to; a past recommendation).

1. 175 SU dies; Red/yellow borders; SU determination to  
maintain superiority...

TN War:

2. End of all life on earth... (Mellman)
3. Contrasting strategy by SU inevitable
4. Escalation, or war of mass, inevitable
5. US-preferred SU attack
6. NATO-preferred SU attack (all-out; millions on all, including...)
7. Very high fixed costs for any significant effectiveness (e.g. conventional  
forces)

With US maneuvering of bases : a) it needed bases in Europe, to use SAC; b) bases in Europe were needed; c) bases could be bought with promise to use them to use SAC, if not be, to retaliate to attract on Europe.

12. SC reductions in divs not as great as Brown + Johnson contemplated; but reductions in SC tax are much greater.

13. p. 48: a reason for inconsistency between forces + "policy": US (Congress) insisted on policy statements; and if you're going to have a policy statements...

15. 100% reorganization for first time, need for counter-efficiency.  
 perhaps structure down to negotiation; importance of  
 holding flexibility. (Chas; Stockport).

new basis for large number of divisions, etc.

"less aggressive"

In principle (Stanley) this could mean greatly larger  
 reserves, to mobilize for really large contingencies  
 initiation; but problem of credibility here (Admiral's  
 hints are too grandiose).

But (Stanley), could consider commitment-signal ready  
 forces: a 2.5 well-equipped division; w.r.t. needs for  
 lesser aggressions, with quickly mobilizable reserves  
 to "hold line." (Initiations limited to 1-4 divs).



CUBA

Aftermath:

1) Khrushchev's letter revealed to USSR on Nov 5,  
revealed to USA, State, WH & heights of crisis,  
27 Oct (Saturday) (Eaton writing memo for  
President on Sat & Sunday) little attention.

Also, McNamara's letter in Nov. "SU take care of it"

Also, US-Sov cooperation with cooperation over Berlin.

(Khrushchev's message on Berlin).

2) US <sup>Proposed</sup> ~~affirmed~~ response for Berlin happened to come to  
MAG on week following Cuban crisis.

Consider events leading up to Cuban as a failure of  
"communication", listening, inference (SU misreading of  
US response; US misreading of SU intention, intentions,  
actions. Warning is successful, accurate, timely  
inference (+ prediction) and, failure of opponent to prevent.

(Does crisis warrant confidence in efficiency of comm,  
offering lessons of failure to prevent crisis or recognize it.  
invasion of Cuba, ... new

Crisis:

1) What's words of measures — public, private — is SC likely to take to be deliberately reassuring?

2) to be deliberately confusing, threatening, misleading?

3) To what extent does SC give contradictory signals to different audiences? To what effect? How would you gauge reaction?

4) What sorts of signals tend to be interpreted unconsciously as deliberately communicative? How common?

(Distinguish a) communication: receiver believes sender intends to inform, or influence opinion, & intends receiver to believe this.

b) inadvertent signal.

(Medical: sign & symptom)

5) What sorts of attitudes favour "neutralize evidence":

lead to discounting or ignoring potentially revealing evidence

or basis for inference; e.g., foregoing useful tests, observations?

What attitudes "underlie claims, detectors": Pearl Harbor, Munich, invasion of France, ... Berlin, Cuba

U

### Type II Outcome

Phase I: US threaten to kill many Russians, in combination with (non-nuclear) / ground war; no US or Europeans.

Phase II: US threaten to kill very many Russians (bigger force, etc.) though at cost of some Europeans + <sup>few</sup> US.

III US threaten to kill most Russians, though at cost of many most Europeans and <sup>some</sup> many US.

IV Cost of US attacks could be most Europeans, many US (depending on SU tactics).

Nuclear Explosion; Russian Nuclear; Rapture of the ship. Pallois

162/2 Nuclear weapons to be considered available for use.

English pressure for A bombs, the weapons. Is it considered distinguishing between A and H bombs?



Aug: 23 July

[Would not Option 1 leave a major role for NATO's force?

NATO the one first-strike force? What would it take?

to get MRGM/IRBM? What would be left?

D What would nature/signature be of the one first strike without letting IRBM/IRBM's?]

Aug:  
[Force designed for GW function; non-nuc cap a bonus.]

[Clarify for Europeans:

6 fines: Digby; 655; and 8th Ave prepared for Planning Study.  
all Kent. Lusk:

V

Effect of payoff function and alternatives considered,  
on probabilities:

From literature "relevant facts, hypotheses, states of  
nature, etc.: information"; hence, influence arises  
grouping of hypotheses considered. But this affects the  
interpretation of evidence (very low prior prob. may be  
associated with a hypothesis, buried in a composite hypothesis;  
given resulting likelihoods, evidence may not favor that  
composite, though it would very strongly favor that hyp.  
if it were considered "relevant" enough to examine separately,  
despite its low prior prob.; hence, the final prob.  
after observations.

Change the payoffs, & alternatives considered,  
and you may readily change the impact of observations  
on alternatives.

From the point of view, it is unrealistic to consider  
inference outside of decision context: unless hypotheses  
can usefully be taken as "given."